At some point I was translating online between English and German (which are very similar languages linguistically), and I noticed the following curious phenomenon.
English - German
street - strassen
hot - heiss
nut - nuss
Each of these words, and many others, is essentially the same in English and German. The only difference is that the "t" sound in English is replaced with a "ss" sound in German.
This is, of course, the exact difference between the "normal" and Ashkenazi pronunciations of Hebrew!
My theory is that, about a thousand years ago, everyone in Germany forgot how to say the letter "t" and started pronouncing it as "s" instead. So words in German that had a "t" in them were now pronounced differently, and eventually this was recognized through the use of a new "ss" letter. For the Jews in Germany at the time, this affected their pronunciation of Hebrew as well as German. Based on the common German pronunciation, the letter "taf" became a "saf".
These Jews and their descendants moved east and became the Ashkenazi population of Europe. Despite their migration and dispersion, they remained remarkably faithful to their customs of speech. Their day-to-day language remained a variation of German (Yiddish), and their pronunciation of Hebrew retained the oddities of the non-Jewish population their ancestors had lived among in Germany.
Today Yiddish has virtually died out, but if you want proof that Ashkenazim indeed have ancestry in Ashkenaz, look no further than the "Ashkenaziss" pronunciation which remains alive and well to this day.
Friday, June 06, 2008
Kimsos chatan al kalah
There is a custom at Jewish weddings that the bride walks in a circle around the groom several times before taking her place under the chuppah. I have never seen a good explanation for this, but skimming through Tanach this afternoon I came across an idea which HAS to be the correct explanation.
Yirmiyahu 31:20-21 says:
שובי בתולת ישראל, שבי אל עריך אלה. עד מתי תתחמקין, הבת השובבה? כי ברא יהוה חדשה בארץ, נקבה תסובב גבר
I would roughly translate this as "Return, O virgin of Israel, return to these your cities. How long will you turn away, you elusive girl? For Hashem has created a new thing in the earth: a woman shall circle a man."
The metaphor, of course, is that God and Israel are the man and woman courting each other. Historically men took the active role in courting women; similarly, God courted us by performing miracles and giving us land and the Torah. But in the messianic era, the equation will be reversed as Israel, the "woman", will "circle" and thereby court God by reaching out for Him with unprecedented spiritual enthusiasm. "I will let loose hunger in the land - not hunger for bread or thirst for water, but to hear the words of Hashem."
The wedding custom seems to be a direct acting out of the verse in Yirmiyahu: literally, the woman circles the man.
If you know the verse's context, it is clear that the custom alludes to the Jewish people's collective destiny and our continued hope for redemption. In this respect, it is like the smashing of the glass done a few minutes later. Both customs indicate our longing for the rebuilding of the Temple and for the messianic era, at which point our rejoicing will finally be complete.
Yirmiyahu 31:20-21 says:
שובי בתולת ישראל, שבי אל עריך אלה. עד מתי תתחמקין, הבת השובבה? כי ברא יהוה חדשה בארץ, נקבה תסובב גבר
I would roughly translate this as "Return, O virgin of Israel, return to these your cities. How long will you turn away, you elusive girl? For Hashem has created a new thing in the earth: a woman shall circle a man."
The metaphor, of course, is that God and Israel are the man and woman courting each other. Historically men took the active role in courting women; similarly, God courted us by performing miracles and giving us land and the Torah. But in the messianic era, the equation will be reversed as Israel, the "woman", will "circle" and thereby court God by reaching out for Him with unprecedented spiritual enthusiasm. "I will let loose hunger in the land - not hunger for bread or thirst for water, but to hear the words of Hashem."
The wedding custom seems to be a direct acting out of the verse in Yirmiyahu: literally, the woman circles the man.
If you know the verse's context, it is clear that the custom alludes to the Jewish people's collective destiny and our continued hope for redemption. In this respect, it is like the smashing of the glass done a few minutes later. Both customs indicate our longing for the rebuilding of the Temple and for the messianic era, at which point our rejoicing will finally be complete.
Thoughts on Ruth
Devarim 10:18 describes God as one "Who performs judgment for the orphan and widow, and loves the stranger..." Intuitively, it seems from this verse that there is a distinction between the orphan and widow, who need support and protection - and the stranger, who needs "love".
This distinction seems to be at the core of Megillat Ruth. Contrary to appearances, I think Naomi and Ruth were relatively financially secure after their return. Naomi's family was well off, and Naomi had sold their plot of land and they were presumably living off the proceeds. Ruth does go out to earn some extra income, but there seems to be no urgency in her decision to do so.
Rather, the book's tension comes from a different question: whether and with whom Ruth will be able to marry. Naomi originally tells Ruth to return to Moav because Naomi has no sons left whom she could marry. When a number of weeks working in Boaz' field have not led to a "shidduch" for Ruth, Naomi takes the initiative in arranging the meeting which leads to their marriage. This is the conclusion of the story: Naomi is once again part of a family, and Ruth - despite coming from the hated Moavite people and having no social standing of her own - gets an appropriate husband. Ruth has been rewarded, not by being rescued from poverty, but by being rescued from loneliness.
The laws of tzedakah obligate us to protect the rights of the poor. It seems from Megillat Ruth that this obligation is not only financial. We are equally obligated to seek out lonely and isolated members of society and to make them feel valued and welcome. It as just as easy to ignore the emotionally poor as the financially poor, so the mitzvah to help them is equally important, and the reward for doing so equally great.
This distinction seems to be at the core of Megillat Ruth. Contrary to appearances, I think Naomi and Ruth were relatively financially secure after their return. Naomi's family was well off, and Naomi had sold their plot of land and they were presumably living off the proceeds. Ruth does go out to earn some extra income, but there seems to be no urgency in her decision to do so.
Rather, the book's tension comes from a different question: whether and with whom Ruth will be able to marry. Naomi originally tells Ruth to return to Moav because Naomi has no sons left whom she could marry. When a number of weeks working in Boaz' field have not led to a "shidduch" for Ruth, Naomi takes the initiative in arranging the meeting which leads to their marriage. This is the conclusion of the story: Naomi is once again part of a family, and Ruth - despite coming from the hated Moavite people and having no social standing of her own - gets an appropriate husband. Ruth has been rewarded, not by being rescued from poverty, but by being rescued from loneliness.
The laws of tzedakah obligate us to protect the rights of the poor. It seems from Megillat Ruth that this obligation is not only financial. We are equally obligated to seek out lonely and isolated members of society and to make them feel valued and welcome. It as just as easy to ignore the emotionally poor as the financially poor, so the mitzvah to help them is equally important, and the reward for doing so equally great.
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
Solo solo hamesilah, saklu me'even
Anyone who has lived here (at least in Haifa, probably in all Israel) knows that the construction companies are incompetent beyond belief.
Take my street for example. For the last two months, the municipality has been repeatedly ripping out the sidewalk and pavement, repaving and repainting it, deciding that they didn't do it correctly (or else damaging what they did correctly by moving heavy machinery over it), and starting the whole process from the beginning. When all is said and done, there will be one or two more parking spots on the street than there were before, a sidewalk made up of both stone tiles and asphalt as opposed to just asphalt like before, and incredible quantities of taxpayer money wasted.
My friend across town (Kiryat Eliezer) tells how within the span of a few months, two kilometers of sidewalk on his street were leveled, a deep trench dug, work done, and the sidewalk replaced - and this whole process repeated twice more from the beginning. The first time was for the future light rail line, then for some kind of cable replacement, then for sewage pipes. Of course it was somehow impossible for any of these digs to be combined with any of the others.
So, the most recent delays reported for the Jerusalem light rail project should surprise nobody. By Israeli standards, the Jerusalem construction work seems more than competent. After all, they only ripped out the already built tracks once, and only on a small portion of the route.
When I think of the employment sectors in the country most in need of reform, banks and rabbinical courts are certainly near the top of the list. And despite what you would THINK would be a much greater amount of competition, construction companies must be right up there with them.
Take my street for example. For the last two months, the municipality has been repeatedly ripping out the sidewalk and pavement, repaving and repainting it, deciding that they didn't do it correctly (or else damaging what they did correctly by moving heavy machinery over it), and starting the whole process from the beginning. When all is said and done, there will be one or two more parking spots on the street than there were before, a sidewalk made up of both stone tiles and asphalt as opposed to just asphalt like before, and incredible quantities of taxpayer money wasted.
My friend across town (Kiryat Eliezer) tells how within the span of a few months, two kilometers of sidewalk on his street were leveled, a deep trench dug, work done, and the sidewalk replaced - and this whole process repeated twice more from the beginning. The first time was for the future light rail line, then for some kind of cable replacement, then for sewage pipes. Of course it was somehow impossible for any of these digs to be combined with any of the others.
So, the most recent delays reported for the Jerusalem light rail project should surprise nobody. By Israeli standards, the Jerusalem construction work seems more than competent. After all, they only ripped out the already built tracks once, and only on a small portion of the route.
When I think of the employment sectors in the country most in need of reform, banks and rabbinical courts are certainly near the top of the list. And despite what you would THINK would be a much greater amount of competition, construction companies must be right up there with them.
Monday, May 26, 2008
Strike Three
In the last two years, my university has had a professor strike and a student strike. Guess who was feeling left out? That's right, us, the grad students went on strike today. The TAs at universities all around the country now have a rotation: at my university they strike on Mondays, at another university on Tuesday, at another on Wednesday, and so on.
In my capacity as a TA, I lead lab sections several days a week, but not on Mondays. So, theoretically, the strike does not affect me. Or so I thought, until I realized after the fact that my office hours are on Monday and the strike applies to them too. Of course, I didn't think of that until after office hours were over.
Totally by chance, I had to go to Jerusalem for a meeting today, so I told everyone I would not be able to come to office hours for that reason. In retrospect, it looks like a lame dodge whereby I tried to tell both sides I was with them. Oh well, I'll just have to make a clear choice next week. It will make little practical difference anyway, nobody every comes to my office hours.
So how will I decide next week? That depends partly on what the grad students I know decide to do, and partly on whether I decide the strike is necessary. I can't complain about my personal situation - grad student stipends are twice what I need to live on here. But for 45 year old lecturers who teach high level courses yet will never get the status or benefits that professors do, things are much worse. Supporting them seems to be a good cause.
In any case, I have a week to think it over. And perhaps by then, the grad students and administration will have come to an agreement.
In my capacity as a TA, I lead lab sections several days a week, but not on Mondays. So, theoretically, the strike does not affect me. Or so I thought, until I realized after the fact that my office hours are on Monday and the strike applies to them too. Of course, I didn't think of that until after office hours were over.
Totally by chance, I had to go to Jerusalem for a meeting today, so I told everyone I would not be able to come to office hours for that reason. In retrospect, it looks like a lame dodge whereby I tried to tell both sides I was with them. Oh well, I'll just have to make a clear choice next week. It will make little practical difference anyway, nobody every comes to my office hours.
So how will I decide next week? That depends partly on what the grad students I know decide to do, and partly on whether I decide the strike is necessary. I can't complain about my personal situation - grad student stipends are twice what I need to live on here. But for 45 year old lecturers who teach high level courses yet will never get the status or benefits that professors do, things are much worse. Supporting them seems to be a good cause.
In any case, I have a week to think it over. And perhaps by then, the grad students and administration will have come to an agreement.
A dream is one sixtieth part of prophecy
I recently dreamed that I visited a (non-Jewish) doctor's office on Shabbat. It wasn't clear why it was necessary or what they did - it may have been an actual procedure or we may have just discussed some medical issue. Anyway, at the end the secretary handed me a piece of paper (bill? insurance form? malpractice waiver?) to sign. I was confronted with a dilemma. I would be breaking Shabbat by signing it, but it would be tricky to convince them to let me not sign it. So what to do? After debating a bit I decided that I was being forced to break Shabbat, it was not really my fault and there was nothing I could do about it, and since I was an observant Jew, I would make a point of minimizing the violation to the fullest extent possible.
So I went ahead and signed the paper - not my full name, but only my first name.
Of course, even before waking up, I realized that writing one word is just as big a violation of Shabbat as writing two.
I have no doubts about what my subconscious was trying to tell me in this dream, though Shabbat was just the metaphor it chose to use. The actual dubious behavior that I need to stop rationalizing is in other halachic realms.
So I went ahead and signed the paper - not my full name, but only my first name.
Of course, even before waking up, I realized that writing one word is just as big a violation of Shabbat as writing two.
I have no doubts about what my subconscious was trying to tell me in this dream, though Shabbat was just the metaphor it chose to use. The actual dubious behavior that I need to stop rationalizing is in other halachic realms.
Friday, May 23, 2008
Conversions and R' Druckman
On main reason why I have not yet posted about the ongoing conversion-nullification scandal is that My Obiter Dicta is more or less saying everything I'd like to say for me. All are encouraged to read his blog.
If you read the comments section too, you might unwittingly come across a few anonymous comments from yours truly, where I thought it useful to add something.
One can't remain silent when a scandal of this magnitude is occurring, but in lieu of investing time and effort in my own posts, I think My Obiter Dicta can be trusted to speak for me.
If you read the comments section too, you might unwittingly come across a few anonymous comments from yours truly, where I thought it useful to add something.
One can't remain silent when a scandal of this magnitude is occurring, but in lieu of investing time and effort in my own posts, I think My Obiter Dicta can be trusted to speak for me.
Wednesday, May 21, 2008
T-Rays and my legacy
Some of the research I am doing for my master's degree involves making sensors for terahertz radiation (or "T-rays"). T-rays are best known because they pass through clothing but are reflected by solid objects such as the human body, making them of immense interest to airport security checkers... as well as to voyeurs and perverts.
I just learned of an equally weird, but less disturbing, use for T-rays. Apparently you can use them to scan a fruit or vegetable for insects. The rays pass through leaves and plant matter, but not through animal skeletons... or something. I will have to look into it more. The implications for kashrut could be revolutionary.
I am excited that my work has taken a more idealistic turn. No longer will history remember me as the guy who made it easier for pornographers to gain new material.* Now, my grandkids will know that it was I who eliminated the terrible scourge of bugs in lettuce and broccoli and allowed God-fearing Jews to eat their Shabbat salads without any fear of infestation.
*Though, to be honest, the through-clothing pictures seem to be unavoidably fuzzy and black and white, and I think that a real live person in tight clothing would be infinitely sexier.
I just learned of an equally weird, but less disturbing, use for T-rays. Apparently you can use them to scan a fruit or vegetable for insects. The rays pass through leaves and plant matter, but not through animal skeletons... or something. I will have to look into it more. The implications for kashrut could be revolutionary.
I am excited that my work has taken a more idealistic turn. No longer will history remember me as the guy who made it easier for pornographers to gain new material.* Now, my grandkids will know that it was I who eliminated the terrible scourge of bugs in lettuce and broccoli and allowed God-fearing Jews to eat their Shabbat salads without any fear of infestation.
*Though, to be honest, the through-clothing pictures seem to be unavoidably fuzzy and black and white, and I think that a real live person in tight clothing would be infinitely sexier.
Tuesday, May 20, 2008
Again from the took-30-seconds-to-write-it post department
I'm constantly getting announcements from various campus organizations advertising their events or whatever. It fills up my inbox, it's sort of annoying. And they ALWAYS feel the need to change the time or location or agenda or contact info just a little, and then send out another email to inform everyone of the changes.
I have a feeling that they do this on purpose, because they know that 90% of people delete the email without even reading through it, and if they can get us to read two emails with essentially the same content, then the chances of somebody seriously considering at least one of them are much higher.
I have a feeling that they do this on purpose, because they know that 90% of people delete the email without even reading through it, and if they can get us to read two emails with essentially the same content, then the chances of somebody seriously considering at least one of them are much higher.
Monday, May 19, 2008
In lieu of a more substantive post
...which is, as always, coming, I bring you this.
On Yom Haatzmaut I was on a hike, and came across a fenced-off mountain valley, and on the fence were signs saying:
שטח ניסוי
כאן יורים
התרחק
Translated:
Testing area
We shoot here
Stay away
The sign was ambiguous: it's not clear whether the testing consists of shooting, or whether shooting (intruders) is why you should stay away. I'm not sure which would be cooler. Since I passed up my chance to intrude into this presumably top-secret military area, I guess I'll never know.
On Yom Haatzmaut I was on a hike, and came across a fenced-off mountain valley, and on the fence were signs saying:
שטח ניסוי
כאן יורים
התרחק
Translated:
Testing area
We shoot here
Stay away
The sign was ambiguous: it's not clear whether the testing consists of shooting, or whether shooting (intruders) is why you should stay away. I'm not sure which would be cooler. Since I passed up my chance to intrude into this presumably top-secret military area, I guess I'll never know.
Monday, April 07, 2008
Purim Torah
(Sorry it's so late.)
There is a phenomenon called the "breakaway minyan" in which a few people from a large community leave the synagogue and start a separate minyan, in competition with the main minyan. This is frowned upon by gabbais and others, one of the reasons being the halachic principle "Berov am hadrat melech", the King is best honored in the presence of "rov am".
However, it is easy to show that "Berov am hadrat melech" actually means the opposite, that you are REQUIRED to have breakaway minyans! How? At the end of the megillah we read that Mordechai was "ratzui lerov echav", and this is interpreted as "approved by MOST of his brethren". That is to say, a minority of the Jews disapproved with Mordechai.
When we apply this understanding of the term "rov" to the minyan issue, we reach a stunning conclusion: "Berov am hadrat melech" means that "the King is best honored in the presence of MOST of the people". Not all of them! It actually honors God more if there is at least one breakaway minyan. So those shuls where everyone davens together are halachically require to start at least one nasty disagreement which will cause the community to split and some people to pray elsewhere. This shouldn't be so hard, most of us want to do this anyway, right?
There is a phenomenon called the "breakaway minyan" in which a few people from a large community leave the synagogue and start a separate minyan, in competition with the main minyan. This is frowned upon by gabbais and others, one of the reasons being the halachic principle "Berov am hadrat melech", the King is best honored in the presence of "rov am".
However, it is easy to show that "Berov am hadrat melech" actually means the opposite, that you are REQUIRED to have breakaway minyans! How? At the end of the megillah we read that Mordechai was "ratzui lerov echav", and this is interpreted as "approved by MOST of his brethren". That is to say, a minority of the Jews disapproved with Mordechai.
When we apply this understanding of the term "rov" to the minyan issue, we reach a stunning conclusion: "Berov am hadrat melech" means that "the King is best honored in the presence of MOST of the people". Not all of them! It actually honors God more if there is at least one breakaway minyan. So those shuls where everyone davens together are halachically require to start at least one nasty disagreement which will cause the community to split and some people to pray elsewhere. This shouldn't be so hard, most of us want to do this anyway, right?
Thursday, April 03, 2008
On halacha and behavior
Tzvi, sorry for the gap in posts. I suddenly lost interest in blogging for some time. Now, that feeling has passed, but I've been very busy recently. I've effectively been juggling too many balls at once, and once the "blogging" ball fell, I couldn't pick it up without dropping all the other balls. Now live is more sane and I can return to posting, though the rate may not be the same as before.
Last Friday morning I found myself at the northeast corner of Jerusalem, waiting for a ride to a hike in the desert which never arrived. Faced with the loss of my day plans, I decided to visit the nearby Hebrew University humanities library, which has plenty of reading material unavailable where I currently live.
Among the interesting things I found in "BM" (the Jewish Studies Library of Congress catalog code, aka "Beit Midrash") was an article comparing secular court systems to halacha. The example given was the law of adverse possession - that a person who has squatted on another's land can gain possession after a certain amount of time. In secular law, it was argued, the court is instructed by law to determine whether it is "reasonable" for the owner not to have objected. Meanwhile, in halacha a length of time is specified, after which date the squatter automatically has rights.
The article argued that halacha and secular law fundamentally differ in their approach to uncertainty. Secular courts are often instructed to find, through debate and consensus among judge, jury, and lawyers, a "reasonable" understanding of the situation. From this a practical conclusion can be derived. Halacha, on the other hand, is generally directed at individuals, not courtrooms. It is unrealistic to expect individuals with their biases and limitations to decide what is "reasonable" for themselves. So in halacha, many inherently fuzzy concepts are given arbitrary black-and-white boundaries when it comes to practical implementation. The concepts are thereby oversimplified a bit, but there is no alternative when the system relies on personal responsibility.
(In fact, adverse possession seems like a bad example for this distinction, for the following reasons. 1) Looking online, I found that most modern legal systems set a specific number of years, just like halacha. 2) The halachic limit here may well be based on a completely practical consideration. If the owner had traveled to the furthest known point on earth from Israel - Spain, "Ispamia" - it would take the news of the squatter's actions one year to reach him and another year for his reply to arrive. So only in the third year could we presume that the owner's silence means consent. If so, this halacha is not an example of over-defining uncertain situations, but rather reflects the existence or nonexistence of factual certainty.)
Anyway, I found this argument especially interesting, given the halachic situation I happened to be in at the time. According to most opinions, if one has not seen the Old City and Temple Mount in 30 days, one must tear one's clothing as an expression of mourning. However, on joyous occasions such as Shabbat and holidays, or even Friday afternoon and Saturday night, mourning is not appropriate and the tearing is not performed. Since the Hebrew University campus has an incredible view of the Old City, this halacha was very relevant to me.
I did not want to ruin a shirt, and possessed no cutting utensil. Plus, I have never seen anyone actually do this tearing, and for both peer-pressure and real halachic reasons, I'm uneasy about mitzvot which I have never seen performed before. Perhaps there is some detail in halacha or circumstances which I'm missing, which means that the mitzvah doesn't apply? So as I walked onto campus, and even after I got to the library (which had windows), I made extra careful not to look in the direction of the Old City, to avoid possibly being obligated in the tearing. I watched the clock carefully. Once it passed halachic noon, I went to one of the many outstanding lookout points and gazed for a while at the Old City - with my clothing intact.
My behavior was totally in accordance with the letter of the law, yet totally contrary to its purpose. Tearing your clothing is supposed to be a symbol of inner anguish at being confronted by the destroyed Temple. Yet all morning I made myself think nonstop of the Temple, only so that I could avoid the tearing! What I did in the afternoon was scarcely better. At the very moment I was supposed to be overcome by enthusiasm for the approaching Shabbat, I turned for a long look at the Temple Mount, thereby experiencing not entirely ecstatic feelings which were not quite in tune with the joy of Shabbat.
The halacha of clothes tearing presupposes a whole set of emotional responses to different religious situations. The other circumstance under which you tear clothes is when confronted with the news of someone's death. It seem that tearing is an outward expression of what you should feel when suddenly confronted with a situation of loss. There are various possible reasons why you do not tear on happy occasions, such as when Shabbat is near. Perhaps your happiness in these situations outweighs the sadness. Or perhaps your sadness is legitimate, but it is inappropriate to express it openly, when the rest of the world is happy. Or perhaps Shabbat has a sort of inherent mystical holiness on which you must be continually focused, which precludes involving oneself in grief. It would take further investigation to decide which of these possibilities is correct. In any case, it's clear that my emotional responses followed none of them.
The previously mentioned article argued that halacha's overly precise definitions were necessary, since the real complexities of the world are in practice not navigable by individuals with all their flaws and biases. My experience with tearing shows that even the precise definitions can be twisted until any semblance of underlying meaning is lost.
But at the same time I distorted the meaning of halacha, a common-sense appraisal of the halachic boundaries alerted me to the fact that I was distorting it. I, like all human beings, am flawed. I cannot balance all the religious demands of the world in exactly the way they should be balanced. But by comparing my actions to halacha, even if the halacha itself is perhaps an over-simplification, I can learn about my flaws and begin to work on correcting them.
Last Friday morning I found myself at the northeast corner of Jerusalem, waiting for a ride to a hike in the desert which never arrived. Faced with the loss of my day plans, I decided to visit the nearby Hebrew University humanities library, which has plenty of reading material unavailable where I currently live.
Among the interesting things I found in "BM" (the Jewish Studies Library of Congress catalog code, aka "Beit Midrash") was an article comparing secular court systems to halacha. The example given was the law of adverse possession - that a person who has squatted on another's land can gain possession after a certain amount of time. In secular law, it was argued, the court is instructed by law to determine whether it is "reasonable" for the owner not to have objected. Meanwhile, in halacha a length of time is specified, after which date the squatter automatically has rights.
The article argued that halacha and secular law fundamentally differ in their approach to uncertainty. Secular courts are often instructed to find, through debate and consensus among judge, jury, and lawyers, a "reasonable" understanding of the situation. From this a practical conclusion can be derived. Halacha, on the other hand, is generally directed at individuals, not courtrooms. It is unrealistic to expect individuals with their biases and limitations to decide what is "reasonable" for themselves. So in halacha, many inherently fuzzy concepts are given arbitrary black-and-white boundaries when it comes to practical implementation. The concepts are thereby oversimplified a bit, but there is no alternative when the system relies on personal responsibility.
(In fact, adverse possession seems like a bad example for this distinction, for the following reasons. 1) Looking online, I found that most modern legal systems set a specific number of years, just like halacha. 2) The halachic limit here may well be based on a completely practical consideration. If the owner had traveled to the furthest known point on earth from Israel - Spain, "Ispamia" - it would take the news of the squatter's actions one year to reach him and another year for his reply to arrive. So only in the third year could we presume that the owner's silence means consent. If so, this halacha is not an example of over-defining uncertain situations, but rather reflects the existence or nonexistence of factual certainty.)
Anyway, I found this argument especially interesting, given the halachic situation I happened to be in at the time. According to most opinions, if one has not seen the Old City and Temple Mount in 30 days, one must tear one's clothing as an expression of mourning. However, on joyous occasions such as Shabbat and holidays, or even Friday afternoon and Saturday night, mourning is not appropriate and the tearing is not performed. Since the Hebrew University campus has an incredible view of the Old City, this halacha was very relevant to me.
I did not want to ruin a shirt, and possessed no cutting utensil. Plus, I have never seen anyone actually do this tearing, and for both peer-pressure and real halachic reasons, I'm uneasy about mitzvot which I have never seen performed before. Perhaps there is some detail in halacha or circumstances which I'm missing, which means that the mitzvah doesn't apply? So as I walked onto campus, and even after I got to the library (which had windows), I made extra careful not to look in the direction of the Old City, to avoid possibly being obligated in the tearing. I watched the clock carefully. Once it passed halachic noon, I went to one of the many outstanding lookout points and gazed for a while at the Old City - with my clothing intact.
My behavior was totally in accordance with the letter of the law, yet totally contrary to its purpose. Tearing your clothing is supposed to be a symbol of inner anguish at being confronted by the destroyed Temple. Yet all morning I made myself think nonstop of the Temple, only so that I could avoid the tearing! What I did in the afternoon was scarcely better. At the very moment I was supposed to be overcome by enthusiasm for the approaching Shabbat, I turned for a long look at the Temple Mount, thereby experiencing not entirely ecstatic feelings which were not quite in tune with the joy of Shabbat.
The halacha of clothes tearing presupposes a whole set of emotional responses to different religious situations. The other circumstance under which you tear clothes is when confronted with the news of someone's death. It seem that tearing is an outward expression of what you should feel when suddenly confronted with a situation of loss. There are various possible reasons why you do not tear on happy occasions, such as when Shabbat is near. Perhaps your happiness in these situations outweighs the sadness. Or perhaps your sadness is legitimate, but it is inappropriate to express it openly, when the rest of the world is happy. Or perhaps Shabbat has a sort of inherent mystical holiness on which you must be continually focused, which precludes involving oneself in grief. It would take further investigation to decide which of these possibilities is correct. In any case, it's clear that my emotional responses followed none of them.
The previously mentioned article argued that halacha's overly precise definitions were necessary, since the real complexities of the world are in practice not navigable by individuals with all their flaws and biases. My experience with tearing shows that even the precise definitions can be twisted until any semblance of underlying meaning is lost.
But at the same time I distorted the meaning of halacha, a common-sense appraisal of the halachic boundaries alerted me to the fact that I was distorting it. I, like all human beings, am flawed. I cannot balance all the religious demands of the world in exactly the way they should be balanced. But by comparing my actions to halacha, even if the halacha itself is perhaps an over-simplification, I can learn about my flaws and begin to work on correcting them.
Tuesday, February 26, 2008
Early Jerusalem
David took the head of the Philistine [Goliath], and brought it to Jerusalem. ... And as David returned from the slaughter of the Philistines, Avner took him, and brought him before Shaul with the head of the Philistine in his hand. (Shmuel Alef 17:54-17:57)
After killing Goliath, David took the dead giant's head to Jerusalem, to show off to the king Shaul.
In Shmuel Bet chapter 5 we learn that Jerusalem was a Jebusite city, which was only conquered and made the capital of Israel after David became king! So what is David doing, years beforehand, bringing Goliath's head to a non-Israelite city? Would a Mossad agent have brought Imad Mugniyah's head to show off to Ehud Olmert in, say, Beirut or Cairo?
To understand this, I think we have to look at the context of David's conquest of Jerusalem. In chapters 2 to 4 there is a bloody civil war between David and Shaul's son Ish-Boshet, each of whom intends to be king over all Israel. At the beginning of chapter five, the Ish-Boshet side finally capitulates and all of Israel recognizes David as king. The very next story is David's conquest of Jerusalem.
I think it's no coincidence that Shaul happened to visit the same city, which David conquered right after subjugating Shaul's tribe and dynasty. Jerusalem is located right on the border between the tribes of Binyamin and Yehudah. In the rivalry and conflict between these tribes, represented by the conflicts between Shaul/Ish-Boshet and David, it is hard to imagine that Jerusalem remained impartial. Presumably, at an early date Jerusalem declared itself a close ally of Binyamin and Shaul's dynasty. Thus Shaul could be expected to frequently visit Jerusalem (and showing them Goliath's head is a good way of emphasizing Israelite strength, and how it's worth it to stay allied with Shaul). And when open warfare broke out between Binyamin and Yehudah, Jerusalem allied with the former, and remained opposed to David until he finally conquered it.
David then declared Jerusalem to be the national capital, in which the Temple would later be built. From a practical perspective, this meant putting the past threats to his power right under his nose, where he could ensure they did not threaten him again. At the same time, choosing a capital on the border between Yehudah and Binyamin symbolized the reconciliation between those tribes, and the peace which he hoped would prevail throughout the entire nation.
After killing Goliath, David took the dead giant's head to Jerusalem, to show off to the king Shaul.
In Shmuel Bet chapter 5 we learn that Jerusalem was a Jebusite city, which was only conquered and made the capital of Israel after David became king! So what is David doing, years beforehand, bringing Goliath's head to a non-Israelite city? Would a Mossad agent have brought Imad Mugniyah's head to show off to Ehud Olmert in, say, Beirut or Cairo?
To understand this, I think we have to look at the context of David's conquest of Jerusalem. In chapters 2 to 4 there is a bloody civil war between David and Shaul's son Ish-Boshet, each of whom intends to be king over all Israel. At the beginning of chapter five, the Ish-Boshet side finally capitulates and all of Israel recognizes David as king. The very next story is David's conquest of Jerusalem.
I think it's no coincidence that Shaul happened to visit the same city, which David conquered right after subjugating Shaul's tribe and dynasty. Jerusalem is located right on the border between the tribes of Binyamin and Yehudah. In the rivalry and conflict between these tribes, represented by the conflicts between Shaul/Ish-Boshet and David, it is hard to imagine that Jerusalem remained impartial. Presumably, at an early date Jerusalem declared itself a close ally of Binyamin and Shaul's dynasty. Thus Shaul could be expected to frequently visit Jerusalem (and showing them Goliath's head is a good way of emphasizing Israelite strength, and how it's worth it to stay allied with Shaul). And when open warfare broke out between Binyamin and Yehudah, Jerusalem allied with the former, and remained opposed to David until he finally conquered it.
David then declared Jerusalem to be the national capital, in which the Temple would later be built. From a practical perspective, this meant putting the past threats to his power right under his nose, where he could ensure they did not threaten him again. At the same time, choosing a capital on the border between Yehudah and Binyamin symbolized the reconciliation between those tribes, and the peace which he hoped would prevail throughout the entire nation.
Sunday, February 24, 2008
Me too!!!
As if an undergrad strike wasn't enough. And a faculty strike wasn't enough. Now the grad students are planning to strike, starting this Thursday. That means me! However, since I am not being a TA right now, this won't affect me until after Pesach, when I'm scheduled to start TAing again. (But I hope this nonsense is finished long before then.)
Friday, February 15, 2008
Tuesday, February 12, 2008
Hebron
The few hundred Jews living in Hebron have a rather well-deserved reputation for hostility towards the Arabs of Hebron. Their track record of harassing and physically abusing their neighbors goes well beyond that of any other Jewish community in the world. Much of this has been publicized, and the Hebron Jews are therefore probably the most-hated group of settlers among the Israeli left wing and international organizations.
Based on that history, what do the Arabs of Hebron think of these Jews? Surely the violence and intimidation they have suffered makes them hate and resent the Jewish presence more than Arabs anywhere else in Israel? Let us hear what they have to say.
"We don't see you as settlers but as residents", their Arab neighbors now say. "Hebron is ours just as it is yours."
Wow. When have any Arabs, anywhere, ever said that Jews in the West Bank are "residents, not settlers", that the West Bank legitimately belongs to them too? As far as I know this degree of respect for them is unprecedented. Could there be any better proof that "Arabs only understand force"?
Now, I know that an "effective" policy is not synonymous with a "moral" policy. And so I cannot support everything the Hebron settlers have done, even if it has earned them legitimacy in their neighbors' eyes. But in terms of obtaining a clearheaded perspective on the Israel/Palestinian conflict, and learning to eliminate policy options which will inevitably be counterproductive, wouldn't this story be a good place to start?
Based on that history, what do the Arabs of Hebron think of these Jews? Surely the violence and intimidation they have suffered makes them hate and resent the Jewish presence more than Arabs anywhere else in Israel? Let us hear what they have to say.
"We don't see you as settlers but as residents", their Arab neighbors now say. "Hebron is ours just as it is yours."
Wow. When have any Arabs, anywhere, ever said that Jews in the West Bank are "residents, not settlers", that the West Bank legitimately belongs to them too? As far as I know this degree of respect for them is unprecedented. Could there be any better proof that "Arabs only understand force"?
Now, I know that an "effective" policy is not synonymous with a "moral" policy. And so I cannot support everything the Hebron settlers have done, even if it has earned them legitimacy in their neighbors' eyes. But in terms of obtaining a clearheaded perspective on the Israel/Palestinian conflict, and learning to eliminate policy options which will inevitably be counterproductive, wouldn't this story be a good place to start?
Saturday, February 09, 2008
And I thought I was doing MY job badly
A taxi driver asked me for directions earlier tonight. What's up with that?
Halachic change
Here's a response I wrote to a comment on somebody's blog. It still needs work, but the rewards of that work are less than the cost in time and effort, so I have no incentive to improve it further. But I think it contains enough good ideas that I don't want it lost forever to history, so I'll quote it here for my own future reference.
========
On the other hand, there's something I've been paying more and more attention to that is somewhat troubling. I never realized how many concepts in the Torah we've basically written off as not relevant. Shmitat ksafim (and the debate about shmitat karka), the prohibition on interest, even the need for two witnesses and warnings for capital punishment (see Drashot HaRan on Shoftim). I completely understand the need to adapt - and I do identify more with chazal's takanot. But on the other hand, if the social and legal structures in the Torah aren't relevant, and couldn't predict the life we live in now - than why should the ritual ones have such power?
Change of custom in itself is not a theological problem. Custom naturally develops over time; were that not the case different customs regarding a single issue would never exist.
One real value of customs (and ritual mitzvot) is that that they provide a sense of continuity. Ideological movements (romanticism, communism, the Enlightenment) rarely remain popular for more than about a century, whereas religions routinely last for thousand of years. That's the case regardless of the truth of the ideology/religion. The emotional resonance of customs and rituals is one big reason why. By lighting shabbat candles, we help ensure that our great-grandchildren will follow our ideals of morality. For that purpose, it does not matter if the manner of candle lighting changes a bit over time, nor that we recognize that such changes can and do take place.
Obviously, though, any explicit mitzvah which has come to be neglected should be observed according to halacha. Halachically speaking, a "minhag" which contradicts halacha is not a valid minhag. Practically speaking, in cases where custom contradicts halacha, that custom is objectively acting against and not preserving that aspect of halacha.
When God commanded us to use edim, hatraah, and so on, He knew that this would not be sufficient for conviction in many cases. If the best solution available is to use secular power to punish as well, then that is how God would have wanted us to act. God presumably intended for us to punish criminal by any possible legitimate means, so the secular judgment expresses His will as the beit din's judgment would have.
Concern about the "relevance" of a mitzvah is a theological difficulty which follows from a more fundamental theological difficulty: doubting God's omniscience and/or the truth of the Torah. While most of us have had these doubts, they are an issue to be recognized as problematic and worked on. Of course it immensely helps to realize that not all Divine will is expressed in legal statements (as one example "gadol shimush talmidei chachamim yoter melimud torah"), and that God doesn't hold it against us if we try our hardest, yet the Torah's vision of society is not achieved.
An instructive parallel is the issue of haaramah, where we mostly say that is OK to "trick" God (i.e. mechirat chametz), because after all God knew about the halachic loopholes when he gave the Torah, and implicitly allowed us to use them. Here too, a correct perception of God's powers and role nullifies concerns we might have about halacha's implementation.
========
On the other hand, there's something I've been paying more and more attention to that is somewhat troubling. I never realized how many concepts in the Torah we've basically written off as not relevant. Shmitat ksafim (and the debate about shmitat karka), the prohibition on interest, even the need for two witnesses and warnings for capital punishment (see Drashot HaRan on Shoftim). I completely understand the need to adapt - and I do identify more with chazal's takanot. But on the other hand, if the social and legal structures in the Torah aren't relevant, and couldn't predict the life we live in now - than why should the ritual ones have such power?
Change of custom in itself is not a theological problem. Custom naturally develops over time; were that not the case different customs regarding a single issue would never exist.
One real value of customs (and ritual mitzvot) is that that they provide a sense of continuity. Ideological movements (romanticism, communism, the Enlightenment) rarely remain popular for more than about a century, whereas religions routinely last for thousand of years. That's the case regardless of the truth of the ideology/religion. The emotional resonance of customs and rituals is one big reason why. By lighting shabbat candles, we help ensure that our great-grandchildren will follow our ideals of morality. For that purpose, it does not matter if the manner of candle lighting changes a bit over time, nor that we recognize that such changes can and do take place.
Obviously, though, any explicit mitzvah which has come to be neglected should be observed according to halacha. Halachically speaking, a "minhag" which contradicts halacha is not a valid minhag. Practically speaking, in cases where custom contradicts halacha, that custom is objectively acting against and not preserving that aspect of halacha.
When God commanded us to use edim, hatraah, and so on, He knew that this would not be sufficient for conviction in many cases. If the best solution available is to use secular power to punish as well, then that is how God would have wanted us to act. God presumably intended for us to punish criminal by any possible legitimate means, so the secular judgment expresses His will as the beit din's judgment would have.
Concern about the "relevance" of a mitzvah is a theological difficulty which follows from a more fundamental theological difficulty: doubting God's omniscience and/or the truth of the Torah. While most of us have had these doubts, they are an issue to be recognized as problematic and worked on. Of course it immensely helps to realize that not all Divine will is expressed in legal statements (as one example "gadol shimush talmidei chachamim yoter melimud torah"), and that God doesn't hold it against us if we try our hardest, yet the Torah's vision of society is not achieved.
An instructive parallel is the issue of haaramah, where we mostly say that is OK to "trick" God (i.e. mechirat chametz), because after all God knew about the halachic loopholes when he gave the Torah, and implicitly allowed us to use them. Here too, a correct perception of God's powers and role nullifies concerns we might have about halacha's implementation.
Tuesday, February 05, 2008
Thoughts on Mishpatim
If a man gives his neighbor money or vessels to keep... [Laws of "shomer hinam"] (22:6-8)
If a man gives his neighbor a donkey, ox, sheep, or any beast to keep... [Laws of "shomer sachar"] (22:9-12)
These passages are the source for the halachic concepts of "shomer hinam" and "shomer sachar" - the consequences for unpaid and paid guardians of property when the property is lost, stolen, or destroyed. The consequences are, of course, more serious when you are being paid to be the guardian and nevertheless something goes wrong.
It's interesting that the verses themselves never mention whether or not the guardian is getting paid. In fact, there seems to be a clear, different distinction between the cases: the second case deals with live animals, the first with all other property. What then is the basis for deriving the concepts of "shomer hinam" and "shomer sachar" from these verses?
To answer this, we must first remember that parshat Mishpatim consists of "case law", in which specific applications of the law are used as examples from which the law in other cases can be derived by comparison. For example, if my animal kills your animal, I'm halachically required to pay you certain amount of damages. This is true no matter which species of animal does the killing. But parshat Mishpatim doesn't say "If an animal kills another animal", but rather "If an ox gores another ox". The reason is that oxen were the most dangerous domestic animals in the ancient Middle East. If one animal killed another, it was most likely a case of one ox goring another ox. Only this most common case is specified, and we are expected to determine the law for all other cases by analogy.
We must therefore ask about each law in parshat Mishpatim: is it intended to be self-contained, or is it just one example of a more universal principle? This determination should be made using common sense. For example, I see no justification for a special law for when my ox gores your ox, which doesn't apply when my sheep butts your sheep or my dog bites your ox. It's more reasonable that a single principle should apply to all cases of animal damage. Since that understanding makes the most sense, and since special laws for the sheep and dog cases are noticeably absent, I can tentatively conclude that the ox case was intended to cover all animal damage cases.
Let me try the same analysis with the two guardian cases. I, at least, can't think of any logical reason why a guardian should have to pay for an animal stolen from him, but not for other stolen property. One possible parallel is the convicted thief, who pays fourfold or fivefold if he sold or killed a stolen animal, but only pays double in all other cases of theft. But this seems intended to deter killing the animal (which would make the crime harder to reverse), and would be less relevant in the guardian case.
Perhaps a better distinction follows from the fact that guarding animals is unlike guarding other types of property. Non-living property can simply be placed in a vault and forgotten about until the owner wants it back. In contrast, keeping an animal requires constant effort. The animal must be fed, cleaned up after, taken for walks, watched for diseases, and so on. This is an extra commitment beyond a person's normal workload, and in the case of food it represents a significant expense.
Therefore, my guess is that while a person would willingly guard a nonliving object, it would take a substantial payment to get someone to guard an animal for any substantial length of time. Perhaps it can be presumed that animal guardianships were generally paid, while other guardianships generally were not.
With that assumption, the halachic difference between the cases is trivial to understand. Extra payment implies an extra level of responsibility. If the guarded object is stolen or destroyed, only the paid guardian is held responsible.
Now, this may not be the only reasonable understanding of the verses, but it's at least as defendable as any other I can think of. There is inherently a level of ambiguity in the "case law" method. When the principles are not stated, it's always possible that someone might disagree with me and assume the existence of a different principle than I do. This can be a disadvantage in that the laws are more ambiguous. But it can also be an advantage, in that there is more flexibility to sensibly solve complicated cases, without being anchored to an explicitly stated principle even when it leads to contradictions or unfairness.
Practically speaking, though, parshat Mishpatim is not detailed enough to give a conclusive ruling in many cases. That is why we had a single Sanhedrin to decide all cases for the Jewish people, and why we now have an "oral" tradition which records how these laws are in fact to be applied.
Whether the "correct" interpretation recorded in the oral tradition was specified at Sinai, or whether God intentionally left to us to interpret and apply parshat Mishpatim as we thought best, is a very interesting question to which I do not know the answer.
If a man gives his neighbor a donkey, ox, sheep, or any beast to keep... [Laws of "shomer sachar"] (22:9-12)
These passages are the source for the halachic concepts of "shomer hinam" and "shomer sachar" - the consequences for unpaid and paid guardians of property when the property is lost, stolen, or destroyed. The consequences are, of course, more serious when you are being paid to be the guardian and nevertheless something goes wrong.
It's interesting that the verses themselves never mention whether or not the guardian is getting paid. In fact, there seems to be a clear, different distinction between the cases: the second case deals with live animals, the first with all other property. What then is the basis for deriving the concepts of "shomer hinam" and "shomer sachar" from these verses?
To answer this, we must first remember that parshat Mishpatim consists of "case law", in which specific applications of the law are used as examples from which the law in other cases can be derived by comparison. For example, if my animal kills your animal, I'm halachically required to pay you certain amount of damages. This is true no matter which species of animal does the killing. But parshat Mishpatim doesn't say "If an animal kills another animal", but rather "If an ox gores another ox". The reason is that oxen were the most dangerous domestic animals in the ancient Middle East. If one animal killed another, it was most likely a case of one ox goring another ox. Only this most common case is specified, and we are expected to determine the law for all other cases by analogy.
We must therefore ask about each law in parshat Mishpatim: is it intended to be self-contained, or is it just one example of a more universal principle? This determination should be made using common sense. For example, I see no justification for a special law for when my ox gores your ox, which doesn't apply when my sheep butts your sheep or my dog bites your ox. It's more reasonable that a single principle should apply to all cases of animal damage. Since that understanding makes the most sense, and since special laws for the sheep and dog cases are noticeably absent, I can tentatively conclude that the ox case was intended to cover all animal damage cases.
Let me try the same analysis with the two guardian cases. I, at least, can't think of any logical reason why a guardian should have to pay for an animal stolen from him, but not for other stolen property. One possible parallel is the convicted thief, who pays fourfold or fivefold if he sold or killed a stolen animal, but only pays double in all other cases of theft. But this seems intended to deter killing the animal (which would make the crime harder to reverse), and would be less relevant in the guardian case.
Perhaps a better distinction follows from the fact that guarding animals is unlike guarding other types of property. Non-living property can simply be placed in a vault and forgotten about until the owner wants it back. In contrast, keeping an animal requires constant effort. The animal must be fed, cleaned up after, taken for walks, watched for diseases, and so on. This is an extra commitment beyond a person's normal workload, and in the case of food it represents a significant expense.
Therefore, my guess is that while a person would willingly guard a nonliving object, it would take a substantial payment to get someone to guard an animal for any substantial length of time. Perhaps it can be presumed that animal guardianships were generally paid, while other guardianships generally were not.
With that assumption, the halachic difference between the cases is trivial to understand. Extra payment implies an extra level of responsibility. If the guarded object is stolen or destroyed, only the paid guardian is held responsible.
Now, this may not be the only reasonable understanding of the verses, but it's at least as defendable as any other I can think of. There is inherently a level of ambiguity in the "case law" method. When the principles are not stated, it's always possible that someone might disagree with me and assume the existence of a different principle than I do. This can be a disadvantage in that the laws are more ambiguous. But it can also be an advantage, in that there is more flexibility to sensibly solve complicated cases, without being anchored to an explicitly stated principle even when it leads to contradictions or unfairness.
Practically speaking, though, parshat Mishpatim is not detailed enough to give a conclusive ruling in many cases. That is why we had a single Sanhedrin to decide all cases for the Jewish people, and why we now have an "oral" tradition which records how these laws are in fact to be applied.
Whether the "correct" interpretation recorded in the oral tradition was specified at Sinai, or whether God intentionally left to us to interpret and apply parshat Mishpatim as we thought best, is a very interesting question to which I do not know the answer.
Monday, February 04, 2008
Cheaters sometimes win
(I can't mention cheating without thinking of the New England Patriots, who just had their perfect season ended by a surprise loss in the Super Bowl. Woohoo! It's pretty awesome that in one game, their legacy went from best-ever to most-embarrassing-and-painful-loss-ever. There, got that that out of my system, now on to the actual post.)
As part of my graduate school work, I grade homework assignments for an undergrad class. It so happens that the homework problems for this class are exactly this year as last year. It also happens that, for one week's homework, the official answer sheet (for last year and this year) includes a mistake.
Would it surprise you to learn that roughly two-thirds of the class wrote down not the right answer, but the exact same incorrect answer which was on the answer sheet?
It's clear to me that all these students possess copies of the answer sheet from last year, and they are copying from it instead of doing the problems themselves. I even saw one student's homework, on which he wrote down the correct answer, but then apparently modified it in each of the last four steps to make it look like he honestly got the official (wrong) answer.
The problem is, since I have no proof than any of these students didn't just make a stupid mistake, there is nothing I can do about this apparent cheating.
I guess it's unrealistic to expect that cheating is any less pervasive here than in the US... but still.
As part of my graduate school work, I grade homework assignments for an undergrad class. It so happens that the homework problems for this class are exactly this year as last year. It also happens that, for one week's homework, the official answer sheet (for last year and this year) includes a mistake.
Would it surprise you to learn that roughly two-thirds of the class wrote down not the right answer, but the exact same incorrect answer which was on the answer sheet?
It's clear to me that all these students possess copies of the answer sheet from last year, and they are copying from it instead of doing the problems themselves. I even saw one student's homework, on which he wrote down the correct answer, but then apparently modified it in each of the last four steps to make it look like he honestly got the official (wrong) answer.
The problem is, since I have no proof than any of these students didn't just make a stupid mistake, there is nothing I can do about this apparent cheating.
I guess it's unrealistic to expect that cheating is any less pervasive here than in the US... but still.
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